🔁Vulnerabilities of Missing EIP-155 Replay Attack Protection

Replay attacks are a significant security concern in blockchain systems, particularly when a protocol is deployed across multiple networks or during network forks. The EIP-155 standard was introduced to address this issue by including chain ID as part of transaction signatures, preventing signed transactions from being replayed on different chains.

Failing to implement EIP-155 properly can lead to critical vulnerabilities where signed messages, such as for accessing functions or approving transactions, can be reused across different chains. In this tutorial, we will explain the purpose of EIP-155, explore how improper implementation can expose your protocol to replay attacks, and provide steps to fix this issue.


Understanding EIP-155: Protecting Against Replay Attacks

EIP-155 was introduced to provide a simple method of replay attack protection by incorporating the chain ID into the transaction signature. Before EIP-155, signed messages could be valid across multiple Ethereum chains, which means an attacker could take a signed transaction from one network (e.g., a testnet) and replay it on another network (e.g., the Ethereum mainnet) to cause unintended or malicious outcomes.

To solve this issue, EIP-155 ensures that signed messages are valid only on the chain where they were intended to be used. The chain ID uniquely identifies the network where a transaction is broadcast, and transactions signed under EIP-155 contain the chain ID as part of the signature.

Without EIP-155 protection, any signed message used in one network could potentially be replayed on another, leading to dangerous vulnerabilities.


Vulnerability: Missing EIP-155 Replay Protection

When smart contracts rely on signed messages for access control or other critical functions (such as adding members, inviting contractors, or publishing projects), it is essential to protect those signatures from being replayed on other networks. Without implementing chain ID verification in these messages, attackers could replay signed messages from one chain on another (such as from a testnet to the mainnet), leading to unauthorized access or unintended behavior.

In the example provided, functions such as publishProject, addMember, and escrow use ecrecover to verify signed messages but do not include chain ID in the message, making the protocol vulnerable to replay attacks if deployed across multiple networks.

Impact of Missing Replay Attack Protection

  1. Cross-Network Exploits: Without EIP-155 protection, a message signed on one network (such as a testnet) could be replayed on another network (such as the Ethereum mainnet), allowing attackers to bypass access controls or perform actions that were not intended for that network.

  2. Hard Fork Vulnerabilities: In the event of a hard fork, the same message could be valid on both the original chain and the forked chain, allowing attackers to replay transactions across both networks and cause unwanted effects.

  3. Security Breakdown in Multichain Deployments: When protocols are deployed on multiple blockchains or testnets, attackers could exploit this vulnerability by executing the same signed message across all chains, leading to unauthorized actions in the protocol.

Conclusion

Missing EIP-155 replay attack protection exposes your protocol to serious vulnerabilities, particularly when deployed across multiple networks or in the event of a network fork. Attackers can take advantage of unsigned messages or improperly protected signatures to replay transactions across different chains, leading to unauthorized access or unintended protocol behavior.

By following the steps outlined in this tutorial, you can ensure that your protocol is protected from replay attacks. Implementing EIP-155 by including the chain ID in all signed messages is a simple yet effective way to safeguard your protocol from these risks. For enhanced security, consider using EIP-712, which provides built-in replay protection and ensures structured data signing across the Ethereum ecosystem.

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