❄️Bulletproofs Paper: Frozen Heart
Summary
Related Vulnerabilities: 6. Frozen Heart
Identified By: TrailOfBits Team
The bulletproof paper, which outlines the bulletproof zero knowledge proof protocol, outlines how to use the Fiat-Shamir transformation to make the proof non-interactive. However, their recommended implementation of the Fiat-Shamir transformation left out a crucial component. This missing component in the non-interactive version of the protocol allowed malicious provers to forge proofs.
Background
Many zero knowledge proof protocols are first designed in an interactive way where the prover and verifier must communicate with each other for multiple rounds in order for the proof to be created and subsequently verified. This often takes the form of:
The prover creates a random value known as the commitment
The verifier replies with a random value known as the challenge
The prover uses the commitment, challenge, and their secret data to create a proof
For the proof to be secure, the verifier’s challenge must be entirely unpredictable and uncontrollable by the prover.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation allows the zero-knowledge proof protocol to become non-interactive by having the prover compute the challenge instead of the verifier. The prover should have no control in the challenge’s value, so the prover must use a hash of all public values, including the commitments. This way the prover cannot easily manipulate the proof to be accepted for invalid inputs.
Bulletproofs use Pedersen commitments, which are of the form:
Here g and h are elliptic curve points and v is a secret number. The bulletproof is meant to prove that v falls within a certain range. Since this commitment is public, it should be included in the Fiat-Shamir transformation used in the protocol.
The Vulnerability
The bulletproof paper provided insecure details on how to implement the Fiat-Shamir transformation for the protocol. Their implementation did not include the Pedersen commitment in the Fiat-Shamir transformation. This means that the challenge value is independent of the Pedersen commitment and so the prover can keep trying random values for the commitment until they get a proof that succeeds for v outside of the desired range. For more details on how exactly this allows a malicious prover to forge a proof, please see the TrailOfBits’ explanation in the references section.
The Fix
In order to prevent this Frozen Heart vulnerability, the Pedersen commitment should be added to the Fiat-Shamir transformation hash. This will make the challenge directly dependent on the commitment and restrict the prover’s freedom when making the proof. The new restriction is enough to prevent the prover from forging proofs.
References
Last updated