Zokyo Auditing Tutorials
  • 🔐Zokyo Auditing Tutorials
  • 📚Tutorials
    • 🏃Tutorial 1: Front-Running
      • 🚀Prerequisites
      • 📘Understanding Front-Running
      • 👓Examples
      • ⚒️Mitigation Steps
      • 🏦Resource Bank to more front running examples
      • 🤝Front-Running Conclusion
    • 🧱Tutorial 2: Unsafe Casting
      • 🚀Prerequisites
      • 📘Understanding Casting
      • 👓Examples
      • 🤝Unsafe Casting Conclusion
    • 👍Tutorial 3: Approvals and Safe Approvals
      • 🚀Prerequisites
      • 📘Understanding Approvals
      • 👓Vulnerability Examples
        • 🔁ERC20 Approval Reset Requirement
        • 😴Ignoring Return Values from ERC20 approve() Function: Potential Miscount of Successful Approvals
        • 🚫Improper use of Open Zeppelins safeApprove() for Non-zero Allowance Increments
        • 🥾Omitted Approval for Contract Interactions Within a Protocol
        • 🤦‍♂️Failing to Reset Token Approvals in Case of Failed Transactions or other actions
        • 💭Miscellaneous
        • ERC20 Approve Race Condition Vulnerability
      • ⚒️Spot the Vulnerability
      • 🤝Approvals and Safe Approvals Conclusion
    • ⛓️Tutorial 4: Block.chainid, DOMAIN_SEPARATOR and EIP-2612 permit
      • 🚀Prerequisites
      • 📘Understanding Block.chainid and DOMAIN_SEPARATOR
      • 👓Examples
      • ⚒️General Mitigation Steps
      • 🤝Tutorial 4 Conclusion
  • 💰Tutorial 5: Fee-On-Transfer Tokens
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Fee-On-Transfer
    • 👓Examples
    • 📘Links to more fee-on-transfer vulnerability examples
    • 🤝Fee-On-Transfer Tokens: Conclusion
  • 🌴Tutorial 6: Merkle Trees
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Merkle Trees
    • 🔎Verification within a Merkle Tree:
    • 📜Merkle Proofs Within Smart Contracts
    • 🖋️Merkle Proof Solidity Implementation
    • 🛑Vulnerabilities When Using Merkle Trees
    • 💀Example Vulnerabilities
    • 🧠Exercise
    • 🤝Merkle Trees Conclusion
  • 🌳Tutorial 7: Merkle-Patricia Trees
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Merkle-Patricia Trees
    • 📕Understanding Merkle-Patrica Trees pt.2
    • 🔎Verification within a Merkle-Patricia Tree
    • 🛑Vulnerabilities When Using Merkle-Patricia Trees
    • 💀Example Vulnerability
    • 🤝Merkle-Patricia Trees: Conclusion
  • 🔁Tutorial 8: Reentrancy
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Reentrancy
    • ⚒️Mitigation
    • 💀The DAO Hack: An In-depth Examination
    • 👓Examples
    • 🏦Resource Bank To More Reentrancy Examples
    • 🤝Conclusion: Reflecting on the Reentrancy Vulnerability
  • 🔂Tutorial 9: Read-Only Reentrancy
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Read-Only Reentrancy
    • 🔨Mitigating Read-Only Reentrancy
    • 👓Real World Examples
    • 🏦Resource Bank To More Reentrancy Examples
    • 🤝Read-Only Reentrancy: Conclusion
  • 🚆Tutorial 10: ERC20 transfer() and safeTransfer()
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding ERC20 transfer() and safeTransfer()
    • 👓Examples
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 📞Tutorial 11: Low level .call(), .transfer() and .send()
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding .call, .transfer, and .send
    • 🛑Understanding the Vulnerabilities of .transfer and .send
    • 👓Examples
    • 🤝Low level .call(), .transfer() and .send() conclusion
  • ☎️Tutorial 12: Delegatecall Vulnerabilities in Precompiled Contracts
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📳Understanding Delegatecall
    • ⛰️EVM, L2s, Bridges, and the Quest for Scalability
    • 🏗️Understanding Precompiles in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
    • 💻Custom Precompiles
    • 💀Potential Vulnerabilities in EVM Implementations: Overlooked DelegateCall in Precompiled Contracts
    • 👓Real World Examples
    • 🤝Delegatecall and Precompiles: Conclusion
  • 🌊Tutorial 13: Liquid Staking
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Liquid Staking
    • 💀Understanding Liquid Staking Vulnerabilities
    • 🛑Example Vulnerability
    • 🐜Example Vulnerability 2
    • 🕷️Example Vulnerability 3
    • 🤝Liquid Staking: Conclusion
  • 🚿Tutorial 14: Slippage
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Slippage in Automated Market Makers (AMMs)
    • 💀Understanding the "Lack of Slippage Check" Vulnerability in Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and DEXs
    • 😡On-Chain Slippage Calculations Vulnerability
    • 📛0 slippage tolerance vulnerability
    • 👓Real World Examples
    • 🏦Resource bank to more slippage vulnerabilities
    • 🤝Slippage Conclusion
  • 📉Tutorial 15: Oracles
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📘Understanding Oracles
    • 📈Types of price feeds
    • 😡Flash Loans
    • 💀Understanding Oracle Vulnerabilities
      • ⛓️The Danger of Single Oracle Dependence
      • ⬇️Using Deprecated Functions
      • ❌Lack of return data validation
      • 🕐Inconsistent or Absent Price Data Fetching/Updating Intervals
    • 🔫Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Price Oracles Vulnerabilities
    • 🛑Found Vulnerabilities In Oracle Implementations
      • ⚖️Newly Registered Assets Skew Consultation Results
      • ⚡Flash-Loan Oracle Manipulations
      • ⛓️Relying Only On Chainlink: PriceOracle Does Not Filter Price Feed Outliers
      • ✍️Not Validating Return Data e.g Chainlink: (lastestRoundData)
      • 🗯️Chainlink: Using latestAnswer instead of latestRoundData
      • 😭Reliance On Fetching Oracle Functionality
      • 🎱Wrong Assumption of 18 decimals
      • 🧀Stale Prices
      • 0️⃣Oracle Price Returning 0
      • 🛶TWAP Oracles
      • 😖Wrong Token Order In Return Value
      • 🏗️miscellaneous
    • 🤝Oracles: Conclusion
  • 🧠Tutorial 16: Zero Knowledge (ZK)
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📚Theory
      • 🔌Circom
      • 💻Computation
      • 🛤️Arithmetic Circuits
      • 🚧Rank-1 Constraint System (R1CS)
      • ➗Quadratic Arithmetic Program
      • ✏️Linear Interactive Proof
      • ✨ZK-Snarks
    • 🤓Definitions and Essentials
      • 🔑Key
      • 😎Scalar Field Order
      • 🌳Incremental Merkle Tree
      • ✒️ECDSA signature
      • 📨Non-Interactive Proofs
      • 🏝️Fiat-Shamir transformation (or Fiat-Shamir heuristic)
      • 🪶Pedersen commitment
    • 💀Common Vulnerabilities in ZK Code
      • ⛓️Under-constrained Circuits
      • ❗Nondeterministic Circuits
      • 🌊Arithmetic Over/Under Flows
      • 🍂Mismatching Bit Lengths
      • 🌪️Unused Public Inputs Optimized Out
      • 🥶Frozen Heart: Forging of Zero Knowledge Proofs
      • 🚰Trusted Setup Leak
      • ⛔Assigned but not Constrained
    • 🐛Bugs In The Wild
      • 🌳Dark Forest v0.3: Missing Bit Length Check
      • 🔢BigInt: Missing Bit Length Check
      • 🚓Circom-Pairing: Missing Output Check Constraint
      • 🏹Semaphore: Missing Smart Contract Range Check
      • 🔫Zk-Kit: Missing Smart Contract Range Check
      • 🤖Aztec 2.0: Missing Bit Length Check / Nondeterministic Nullifier
      • ⏸️Aztec Plonk Verifier: 0 Bug
      • 🪂0xPARC StealthDrop: Nondeterministic Nullifier
      • 😨a16z ZkDrops: Missing Nullifier Range Check
      • 🤫MACI 1.0: Under-constrained Circuit
      • ❄️Bulletproofs Paper: Frozen Heart
      • 🏔️PlonK: Frozen Heart
      • 💤Zcash: Trusted Setup Leak
      • 🚨14. MiMC Hash: Assigned but not Constrained
      • 🚔PSE & Scroll zkEVM: Missing Overflow Constraint
      • ➡️PSE & Scroll zkEVM: Missing Constraint
      • 🤨Dusk Network: Missing Blinding Factors
      • 🌃EY Nightfall: Missing Nullifier Range Check
      • 🎆Summa: Unconstrained Constants Assignemnt
      • 📌Polygon zkEVM: Missing Remainder Constraint
    • 💿ZK Security Resources
  • 🤝Tutorial 17 DEX's (Decentralized Exchanges)
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📚Understanding Decentralized Exchanges
    • 💀Common Vulnerabilities in DEX Code
      • 🔎The "Lack of Slippage Check" Vulnerability in Automated Market Makers (AMMs) a
      • 😡On-Chain Slippage Calculations Vulnerability
      • 📛Slippage tolerance vulnerability
      • 😵How Pool Implementation Mismatches Pose a Security Risk to Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs)
      • 🏊‍♂️Vulnerabilities in Initial Pool Creation - Liquidity Manipulation Attacks
      • 🛑Vulnerabilities In Oracle Implementations
        • ⚖️Newly Registered Assets Skew Consultation Results
        • ⚡Flash-Loan Oracle Manipulations
        • ⛓️Relying Only On Chainlink: PriceOracle Does Not Filter Price Feed Outliers
        • ✍️Not Validating Return Data e.g Chainlink: (lastestRoundData)
        • 🗯️Chainlink: Using latestAnswer instead of latestRoundData
        • 😭Reliance On Fetching Oracle Functionality
        • 🎱Wrong Assumption of 18 decimals
        • 🧀Stale Prices
        • 0️⃣Oracle Price Returning 0
        • 🛶TWAP Oracles
        • 😖Wrong Token Order In Return Value
        • 🏗️miscellaneous
      • 🥶Minting and Burning Liquidity Pool Tokens
      • 🎫Missing Checks
      • 🔞18 Decimal Assumption
        • 📌Understanding ERC20 Decimals
        • 💀Examples Of Vulnerabilities To Do With Assuming 18 Decimals
      • 🛣️Incorrect Swap Path
      • The Importance of Deadline Checks in Swaps
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 🤖Tutorial 18: Proxies
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📥Ethereum Storage and Memory
    • 📲Ethereum Calls and Delegate Calls
    • 💪Upgradability Patterns in Ethereum: Enhancing Smart Contracts Over Time
    • 🔝Proxy Upgrade Pattern in Ethereum
    • 🌀Exploring the Landscape of Ethereum Proxies
      • 🪞Transparent Proxies
      • ⬆️UUPS Proxies
      • 💡Beacon Proxies
      • 💎Diamond Proxies
  • 🔞Tutorial 19: 18 Decimal Assumption
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 📌Understanding ERC20 Decimals
    • 💀Examples Of Vulnerabilities To Do With Assuming 18 Decimals
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • ➗Tutorial 20: Arithmetic
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 🕳️Arithmetic pitfall 1: Division by 0
    • 🔪Arithmetic pitfall 2: Precision Loss Due To Rounding
    • 🥸Arithmetic pitfall 3: Erroneous Calculations
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 🔁Tutorial 21: Unbounded Loops
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • ⛽Gas Limit Vulnerability
    • 📨Transaction Failures Within Loops
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 📔Tutorial 22: `isContract`
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 💀Understanding the 'isContract()` vulnerability
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 💵Tutorial 23: Staking
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 💀First Depositor Inflation Attack in Staking Contracts
    • 🌪️Front-Running Rebase Attack (Stepwise Jump in Rewards)
    • ♨️Rugability of a Poorly Implemented recoverERC20 Function in Staking Contracts
    • 😠General Considerations for ERC777 Reentrancy Vulnerabilities
    • 🥏Vulnerability: _lpToken and Reward Token Confusion in Staking Contracts
    • 🌊Slippage Checks
    • 🌽The Harvest Functionality in Vaults: Issues and Best Practices
  • ⛓️Tutorial 24: Chain Re-org Vulnerability
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • ♻️Chain Reorganization (Re-org) Vulnerability
    • 🧑‍⚖️Chain Re-org Vulnerability in Governance Voting Mechanisms
  • 🌉Tutorial 25: Cross Chain Bridges Vulnerabilities
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • ♻️ERC777 Bridge Vulnerability: Reentrancy Attack in Token Accounting
      • 🛑Vulnerability: Withdrawals Can Be Locked Forever If Recipient Is a Contract
    • 👛The Dangers of Not Using SafeERC20 for Token Transfers
    • Uninitialized Variable Vulnerability in Upgradeable Smart Contracts
    • Unsafe External Calls and Their Vulnerabilities
    • Signature Replay Attacks in Cross-Chain Protocols
  • 🚰Tutorial 26: Integer Underflow and Overflow Vulnerabilities in Solidity (Before 0.8.0)
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 💀Understanding Integer Underflow and Overflow Vulnerabilities
    • 🤝Conclusion
  • 🥏Tutorial 27: OpenZeppelin Vulnerabilities
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 🛣️A Guide on Vulnerability Awareness and Management
      • 🤝Conclusion
  • 🖊️Tutorial 28: Signature Vulnerabilities / Replays
    • 🚀Prerequisites
    • 🔏Reusing EIP-712 Signatures in Private Sales
    • 🔁Replay Attacks on Failed Transactions
    • 📃Improper Token Validation in Permit Signature
  • 🤝Tutorial 29: Solmate Vulnerabilities
    • 🔏Lack of Code Size Check in Token Transfer Functions in Solmate
  • 🧱Tutorial 30: Inconsistent block lengths across chains
    • 🕛Incorrect Assumptions about Block Number in Multi-Chain Deployments
  • 💉Tutorial 31: NFT JSON and XSS injection
    • 📜Vulnerability: JSON Injection in tokenURI Functions
    • 📍Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability via SVG Construction in Smart Contracts
  • 🍃Tutorial 32: Merkle Leafs
    • 🖥️Misuse of Merkle Leaf Nodes
  • 0️Tutorial 33: Layer 0
    • 📩Lack of Force Resume in LayerZero Integrations
    • ⛽LayerZero-Specific Vulnerabilities in Airdropped Gas and Failure Handling
    • 🔓Understanding the Vulnerability of Blocking LayerZero Channels
    • 🖊️Copy of Understanding the Vulnerability of Blocking LayerZero Channels
  • ♻️Tutorial 34: Forgetting to Update the Global State in Smart Contracts
  • ‼️Tutorial 35: Wrong Function Signature
  • 🛑Tutorial 36: Handling Edge Cases of Banned Addresses in DeFi
  • Tutorial 37: initializer and onlyInitializing
  • ➗Tutorial 38: Eigen Layer
    • 📩Denial of Service in NodeDelegator Due to EigenLayer's maxPerDeposit Check
    • 📈Incorrect Share Issuance Due to Strategy Updates in EigenLayer Integrations
    • 🔁nonReentrant Vulnerability in EigenLayer Withdrawals
  • ⚫Tutorial 39: Wormhole
    • 📩Proposal Execution Failure Due to Guardian Set Change
  • 💼Tutorial 40: Uniswap V3
    • 📩Understanding and Mitigating Partial Swaps in Uniswap V3
    • 🌊Underflow Vulnerability in Uniswap V3 Position Fee Growth Calculations
    • ➗Handling Decimal Discrepancies in Uniswap V3 Price Calculations
  • 🔢Tutorial 41: Multiple Token Addresses in Proxied Tokens
    • 🔓Understanding Vulnerabilities Arising from Tokens with Multiple Entry Points
  • 🤖Tutorial 42: abiDecoder v2
    • 🥥Vulnerabilities from Manipulated Token Interactions Using ABI Decoding
  • ❓Tutorial 43: On-Chain Randomness
    • Vulnerabilities in On-Chain Randomness and How It Can Be Exploited
  • 😖Tutorial 44: Weird ERC20 Tokens
    • Weird Token List
  • 🔨Tutorial 45: Hardcoded stable coin values
  • ❤️Tutorial 46: The Risks of Chainlink Heartbeat Discrepancies in Smart Contracts
  • 👣Tutorial 47: The Risk of Forgetting a Withdrawal Mechanism in Smart Contracts
  • 💻Tutorial 48: Governance and Voting
    • Flash Loan Voting Exploit
    • Exploiting Self-Delegation
    • 💰Missing payable Keyword in Governance Execute Function
    • 👊Voting Multiple Times by Shifting Delegation
    • 🏑Missing Duplicate Veto Check
  • 📕Tutorial 49: Not Conforming To EIP standards
    • 💎Understanding EIP-2981: NFT Royalty Standard
    • 👍Improper Implementation of EIP-2612 Permit Standard
    • 🔁Vulnerabilities of Missing EIP-155 Replay Attack Protection
    • ➡️Vulnerabilities Due to Missing EIP-1967 in Proxy Contracts
    • 🔓Vulnerability of Design Preventing EIP-165 Extensibility
    • 🎟️The Dangers of Not Properly Implementing ERC-4626 in Yield Vaults
    • 🔁EIP-712 Implementation and Replay Attacks
  • ⏳Tutorial 50: Vesting
    • 🚔Vulnerability of Allowing Unauthorized Withdrawals in Vesting Contracts
    • 👊Vulnerability of Unbounded Timelock Loops in Vesting Contracts
    • ⬆️Vulnerability of Incorrect Linear Vesting Calculations
    • ⛳Missing hasStarted Modifier
    • 🔓Vulnerability in Bond Depositor's Vesting Period Reset
  • ⛽Tutorial 51: Ethereum's 63/64 Gas Rule
    • 🛢️Abusing Ethereum's 63/64 Gas Rule to Manipulate Contract Behavior
  • 📩Tutorial 52: NPM Dependency Confusion and Unclaimed Packages
    • 💎Exploiting Unclaimed NPM Packages and Scopes
  • 🎈Tutorial 53: Airdrops
    • 🛄Claiming on Behalf of Other Users
    • 🧲Repeated Airdrop Claims Vulnerability
    • 🍃Airdrop Vulnerability – Merkle Leaves and Parent Node Hash Collisions
  • 🎯Tutorial 54: Precision
    • 🎁Vulnerabilities Due to Insufficient Precision in Reward Calculations
    • Min-Shares: Fixed Minimum Share Values for Tokens with Low Decimal Precision
    • Vulnerability Due to Incorrect Rounding When the Numerator is Not a Multiple of the Denominator
    • Vulnerability from Small Deposits Being Rounded Down to Zero Shares in Smart Contracts
    • Precision Loss During Withdrawals from Vaults Can Block Token Transfers Due to Value < Amount
    • 18 Decimal Assumption Scaling: Loss of Precision in Asset Conversion Due to Incorrect Scaling
  • Tutorial 55: AssetIn == AssetOut, FromToken == ToToken
    • 🖼️Vulnerability: Missing fromToken != toToken Check
  • 🚿Tutorial 56: Vulnerabilities Related to LP Tokens Being the Same as Reward Tokens
    • 🖼️Vulnerabilities Caused by LP Tokens Being the Same as Reward Tokens
  • Tutorial 57: Unsanitized SWAP Paths and Arbitrary Contract Call Vulnerabilities
    • 📲Arbitrary Contract Calls from Unsanitized Paths
  • Tutorial 58: The Risk of Infinite Approvals and Arbitrary Contract Calls
    • 🪣Exploiting Infinite Approvals and Arbitrary Contract Calls
  • Tutorial 59: Low-Level Calls in Solidity Returning True for Non-Existent Contracts
    • Low-Level Calls Returning True for Non-Existent Contracts
  • 0️⃣Tutorial 60: The Impact of PUSH0 and the Shanghai Hardfork on Cross-Chain Deployments > 0.8.20
    • PUSH0 and Cross-Chain Compatibility Challenges
  • 🐍Tutorial 61: Vyper Vulnerable Versions
    • Vyper and the EVM
  • ⌨️Tutorial 62: Typos in Smart Contracts — The Silent Threat Leading to Interface Mismatch
    • Vyper and the EVM
  • ☁️Tutorial 63: Balance Check Using ==
    • The Vulnerability: == Balance Check
  • 💍Tutorial 64: Equal Royalties for Unequal NFTs
    • Understanding the Problem: Equal Royalties for Unequal NFTs
  • 🖼️Tutorial 65: ERC721 and NFTs
    • The Risk of Using transferFrom Instead of safeTransferFrom in ERC721 Projects
    • ❄️Why _safeMint Should Be Used Instead of _mint in ERC721 Projects
    • The Importance of Validating Token Types in Smart Contracts
    • 📬Implementing ERC721TokenReceiver to Handle ERC721 Safe Transfers
    • NFT Implementation Deviating from ERC721 Standard in Transfer Functions
    • NFT Approval Persistence after Transfer
    • 🎮Gameable NFT Launches through Pseudo-Randomness
    • 2️⃣Protecting Buyers from Losing Funds Due to Claimed NFT Rewards on Secondary Markets
    • ♻️Preventing Reentrancy When Using SafeERC721
    • 🖊️Preventing Re-use of EIP-712 Signatures in NFT Private Sales
  • 2️⃣Tutorial 66: Vulnerability Arising from NFTs Supporting Both ERC721 and ERC1155 Standards
  • 📷Tutorial 67: ERC1155 Vulnerabilities
    • ♻️Preventing Reentrancy in OpenZeppelin's SafeERC1155
    • 🛫Vulnerabilities in OpenZeppelin's ERC1155Supply Contract
    • Understanding Incorrect Token Owner Enumeration in ERC1155Enumerable
    • Avoiding Breaking ERC1155 Composability with Improper safeTransferFrom Implementation
    • 💍Ensuring Compatibility with EIP-2981 in ERC1155 Contracts
  • 🪟Informational Vulnerabilities
  • ⛽Gas Efficiency
  • 💻Automation Tools
  • 🔜Out Of Gas (Coming Soon)
  • 🔜DEX Aggregators (Coming Soon)
  • 🔜Bribes (Coming Soon)
  • 🔜Understanding Compiled Bytecode (coming soon)
  • 🔜Deployment Mistakes (coming soon)
  • 🔜Optimistic Roll-ups (coming soon)
  • 🔜Typos (coming soon)
  • 🔜Try-Catch (coming soon)
  • 🔜NFT Market-place (coming soon)
  • 🔜Upgrade-able Contracts (coming soon)
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  1. Tutorial 33: Layer 0

Understanding the Vulnerability of Blocking LayerZero Channels

LayerZero is a cross-chain communication protocol that allows decentralized applications (dApps) to send messages between different blockchains. A key aspect of its architecture is ensuring ordered messaging and reliable communication across chains. However, certain vulnerabilities can arise when LayerZero channels become blocked due to transaction failures. One such vulnerability allows an attacker to intentionally block a LayerZero channel, rendering the protocol inoperable until the failed transaction is resolved.

In this tutorial, we will explore the generalized concept of channel blocking in LayerZero and how attackers can exploit this to disrupt communication between chains. We will also discuss mitigation strategies to prevent such attacks and ensure the reliable functioning of cross-chain systems.


Generalized Vulnerability: Blocking of Cross-Chain Channels

Overview of the Channel Blocking Vulnerability

In LayerZero, communication between chains occurs via messaging channels. These channels must maintain strict message ordering to ensure that the sequence of cross-chain events is preserved. However, the default behavior in LayerZero creates a potential vulnerability: if a message sent to a destination chain fails (e.g., due to a transaction failure or logic error), the messaging channel becomes blocked.

Once a channel is blocked, no further messages can be processed until the failed transaction is retried and succeeds. This behavior can be exploited by attackers to intentionally block a messaging channel by initiating transactions they know will fail, thereby preventing the protocol from executing further cross-chain operations.


Why Channel Blocking Happens in LayerZero

  1. Message Ordering Requirements: LayerZero enforces strict message ordering to ensure that messages sent between chains are processed in the correct sequence. This means that if one message fails, it must be retried and resolved before any subsequent messages can be processed. This strict ordering creates a potential point of failure: if a message fails and cannot be retried successfully, the entire channel is effectively blocked.

  2. Default Behavior of Blocking on Failure: According to the LayerZero documentation, when a transaction on the destination chain fails, the entire channel is blocked until the transaction is successfully retried. This default behavior ensures that messages maintain their order but opens the door for intentional or unintentional blocking.

  3. Non-Implementation of Non-Blocking Logic: To prevent channel blocking, LayerZero provides a non-blocking approach that allows subsequent messages to continue being processed even if a previous message fails. However, if this non-blocking approach is not implemented, the protocol becomes vulnerable to channel blocking attacks.


Attack Scenario: Blocking a LayerZero Channel

Step-by-Step Breakdown of the Attack

  1. Initiating a Malicious Transaction: The attacker initiates a transaction on the source chain that they know will fail when processed on the destination chain. This could involve sending invalid data, triggering a logic error in the contract, or exploiting known vulnerabilities in the destination chain’s contract logic.

  2. Message Failure: When the message reaches the destination chain, it fails during execution. Due to LayerZero’s default behavior, the messaging channel between the two chains becomes blocked because the failed message must be retried and successfully executed before any further messages can be processed.

  3. Blocking the Channel: As a result of the failed transaction, the messaging channel between the source and destination chains is blocked. No new messages can be processed, meaning all subsequent cross-chain operations are effectively halted.

  4. Disruption of Protocol Operations: The attacker has now disrupted the normal operation of the protocol. As long as the failed transaction is not successfully retried, the messaging channel remains blocked, preventing legitimate users from executing cross-chain operations.

Impact of the Attack

  • Service Downtime: Cross-chain operations between the affected chains are halted, leading to a degraded user experience and potential financial losses.

  • Protocol Disruption: Critical functionality of the protocol, such as token transfers, staking, or governance actions, may be disrupted, impacting the protocol’s reliability.

  • Potential Financial Exploits: In certain cases, the attacker could use this disruption to gain a financial advantage by preventing others from executing transactions or manipulating market conditions.


Mitigation Strategies: Preventing Channel Blocking in LayerZero

To prevent channel blocking attacks, it is crucial to implement LayerZero’s non-blocking approach for cross-chain communication. The non-blocking approach allows protocols to continue processing subsequent messages even if a previous message fails, ensuring that the messaging channel is not blocked indefinitely.

1. Implement the Non-Blocking LayerZero Approach

LayerZero provides a non-blocking solution that can be implemented in any protocol to prevent channel blocking. In this approach, if a message fails on the destination chain, it is not retried immediately, and subsequent messages can continue being processed. The failed message can later be retried manually, allowing the channel to remain open for further communication.

  • How It Works: In the non-blocking approach, instead of blocking the entire channel when a message fails, the protocol stores the failed message and allows future messages to be processed. The failed message can be manually retried at a later time without disrupting the overall communication flow.

  • Example Implementation: LayerZero provides an example contract, NonblockingLzApp.sol, which includes logic for handling failed messages without blocking the channel. Implementing this in your protocol can ensure that the system remains resilient to channel blocking attacks.

2. Regular Monitoring and Retrying of Failed Messages

Protocols should regularly monitor the status of cross-chain messages and ensure that failed messages are retried in a timely manner. By automating the retry process or implementing an alert system to notify administrators of failed transactions, protocols can minimize the risk of prolonged channel blocking.

  • Best Practice: Set up automated systems that monitor failed transactions and trigger retries. Additionally, developers can build in mechanisms to refund users or resolve failed transactions to prevent malicious actors from exploiting failures.

3. Secure Input Validation

Many channel-blocking attacks stem from transactions that are designed to fail. To prevent such failures, protocols should implement strong input validation on both the source and destination chains. By validating inputs thoroughly, the protocol can reduce the likelihood of failed transactions and minimize the risk of channel blocking.

  • Best Practice: Validate all input data rigorously to prevent invalid or malicious transactions from triggering failures on the destination chain.

Conclusion

Blocking LayerZero channels is a critical vulnerability that can disrupt cross-chain communication and halt protocol operations. By understanding the risks associated with message ordering and transaction failures, developers can implement LayerZero’s non-blocking approach to maintain robust cross-chain functionality. Implementing this solution ensures that failed transactions do not block the entire communication channel, protecting the protocol from attacks that could lead to prolonged downtime and service disruption.

By adopting these best practices, protocols can avoid the pitfalls of channel blocking and ensure that their LayerZero integration remains resilient and secure.

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Last updated 7 months ago

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